StrategyPage brings us an incisive, succinct summary of the Iraq war.

Because of Saddam’s continued support of terrorists, weapons of mass destruction and bad behavior in general, the U.S. invaded Iraq. Using three divisions, the country was conquered in three weeks. Britain had done the same thing in 1941 with three divisions, and also took Baghdad in less than three weeks. But in 1941, the British went in because Iraq had declared itself an ally of Nazi Germany. After deposing the pro-German Sunni Arab politicians, the Brits simply installed a pro-British Sunni Arab strong man.

When the U.S. led coalition ousted Iraqi troops from Kuwait in 1991, most observers, including media pundits, missed a very important detail. The U.S. has gotten Arab nations to join the operation only because of a promise not to invade Iraq itself. This was no secret at the time, and was a reflection of Arab politics. That is, the Sunnis must be in charge, especially in Iraq, which is considered the front line for the defense of the Arab world from Iran.

… Iraq, and most of the countries in the Middle East, are broken. They have been for a long time. We in the West have generally ignored it, because there were no workable solutions that were easily available. Then came the latest wave of Islamic terrorism. This got worse, until September 11, 2001, and then the prospect of mass murder in our own backyard became a reality. But at that point, the West became divided over the solution. Do we keep treating the terrorists as a police problem, and wait them out? That is known to work. But the threat of even deadlier terrorist attacks made more dramatic moves attractive to many, especially in the United States. That resulted in Iraq, confronting the Arab problems up close and personal. It ain’t pretty. But unless the Arab problems are solved, the ugly aftereffects will still be there, and so will the threat of mass murder on the street where you live.

The war on terror, and the war in Iraq, are all part of a struggle within Islam. Do we keep on with the same pattern of rebellion and repression, or do we try developing a civil society. Until the Iraqis decided what kind of country they wanted to live in, the war went on.

The anarchy that followed the American conquest of Baghdad was quickly accepted for what it was, spontaneous revenge against the Sunni Arab dictatorship and the thieves that ran it. Things settled down for a while, until the Sunni Arabs began the terror campaign to drive the Americans out, intimidate the Shia Arabs, and regain control of the country. These were all high-risk undertakings, and all failed. But not until after four years of terror, and over 100,000 dead Iraqis, did the Sunni Arabs admit defeat. After the coalition took over, there was no more Iraqi police force or army. That’s because the Saddam era security forces were recruited mainly for loyalty to Saddam, and the Sunni Arab minority.

Before Saddam was ousted , the active duty army consisted of about 250,000 troops. Some 40 percent of these were the elite Republican Guard. Nearly all the army officers, and most of the NCOs, were Sunni Arabs. In the Republican Guard, everyone was Sunni Arab, as this outfit was, in effect, Saddam’s “royal guard” and his main defense against a revolt by the army. The other 150,000 troops were mainly Sunni and Shia draftees, although there were Kurd and other minorities (Turks, and several Christian groups).

At the time of the invasion, about 100,000 reservists (men who had done their conscript service recently) had been recalled to active duty. There were another 600,000 or so reservists who could have been called up. But many of these were Shia Arabs, and Saddam didn’t want to see lots of armed Shia, in uniform or not. Unless you wanted an Iraqi security force led by Sunni Arabs, many of dubious loyalty to a democratic Iraq, you had to disband the security forces. The army and police force had to be rebuilt.

After two years of enormous effort, a new force was created. This was not easy, for the old Iraqi army was widely considered (based on performance alone) to be one of the most inept in the world. Despite spending over a hundred billion dollars on it, Saddam was never able to build a force that could fight effectively. Without the widespread use of chemical weapons in the 1980s, Iraq would have been overrun by an army of poorly equipped Iranian amateurs. The main problem was that the old Iraqi army was designed more for political, than combat, reliability. That’s the main reason it was disbanded shortly after Iraq was conquered in 2003.