big baloney in a nutshell
Nothing demonstrates the bias of Big Baloney like the treatment of two books by two former members of the Bush administration.
Former press secretary Scott McClellan’s dirt dishing book is treated to a front page review in today’s LA Times. Douglas Feith, who wielded greater influence on policy as Undersecretary of Defense, wrote a heavily-sourced book that every historian of this period will own.
Feith’s book, as we’ve noted, has not been reviewed by any of Big Baloney’s big names — not the NYT, WaPo or LAT. That they’re ignoring a book by a man they demonized as a warmongering neocon speaks volumes.
But back to McClellan, one of his beefs was:
“In the permanent campaign era, it was all about manipulating sources of public opinion to the president’s advantage,” McClellan writes.
Oh, do tell. Why would that be? And how well did that work out?
When the New York Times and Washington Post decide that you’re the enemy, you have a second flank to defend, 24/7. (And when you’re golden, like Obama, you can rest easy.)
One anecdote from Feith’s book should give everyone pause, liberals and conservatives alike, because it demonstrates the sick interface between government and media that disserves us all.
Shortly after 9/11, Rumsfeld and others inside the Pentagon decided that our war on Islamist fascism should be fought both militarily and ideologically. The latter should have been the province of the State Department, but, Feith writes, “neither [Colin] Powell or [Richard] Armitage saw the philosophical dimension of the war as particularly important.”
So with Rumsfeld’s blessing, Feith created the Office of Strategic Influence to fight jihadist ideology at the source. He assembled a staff and recruited Air Force General Simon Worden to run it. One of his original ideas was to create cheap, wireless-connected laptops and information kiosks that could be distributed in remote Pakistan where Madrassas were twisting young minds.
But OSI stepped on toes, both at State and inside the Pentagon, particularly with Victoria “Torie” Clark, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, who thought her department had authority over all “outreach” programs.
Just as OSI was getting going, on February 19, 2002, the New York Times ran a front page story citing unnamed “military officials” claiming that the…
“Pentagon is developing plans to provide news items, possibly even false ones, to foreign news media organizations as part of a new effort to influence public sentiment and policy makers in both friendly and unfriendly countries.”
The story said others “inside the Pentagon” were worried that this could undermine credibility of their efforts. The NYT went on to suggest…
“General Worden envisions a broad mission ranging from ‘black’ campaigns that use disinformation and other covert activities to ‘white’ public affairs that rely on truthful releases.”
The disinformation charge was untrue, but it spread quickly among a news media that distrusted and despised President Bush. Chris Matthews called OSI a plan “worthy of Joseph Goebbels.”
Such stories were readily retold and embellished by a hostile world media, always keen to promote anti-Americanism. Bush was traveling overseas and was badgered by questions about OSI.
OSI died in its cradle, on February 26, 2002. The State Department never picked up the initiative and it went undone, to the detriment of everyone in the western world. Feith writes of…
…the irony of an office formed to plan information operations had been blown away by a disinformation operation. Concentrating on foreign enemies, OSI hadn’t protected its back from other Pentagon officials.
And from the New York Times.