Hippies, Tea Partiers and Bunk
In 1971, the University of Maryland was a popular spot for anti-war rallies. It was close to Washington DC, but offered vast grassy spaces.
I was a student there and attended rallies and protests for the same reason many, if not most, of my fellow students attended: it was exciting. There was music, people passed the pipe and we got to feel righteous at the same time.
Rock music was the bait that drew the crowd. The strident political speeches (”puppet regime” always seemed to come up) were the interruption. One night I got a ride home from some guy who complained about all the talk, “Too many raps, man, too many raps.”
This came to mind reading Lee Harris’s analysis of the Tea Party movement and David Brooks assertion that hippies and Tea Partiers have much in common.
Today many intelligent observers grope to discover what the Tea Party is all about and where it belongs on the Richter Scale of historical events. Does it signal the approach of a catastrophic upheaval, like the 9.0 earthquake of 2004 which sent devastating tsunamis across the Indian Ocean? Or will the Tea Party movement register only as a light quake in the 4.0 to 4.9 range, entailing “noticeable shaking of indoor items, rattling noises,” with “significant damage unlikely”?
When a political, religious, or cultural movement is first stirring, those who try to forecast its future development seize one feature of the movement and attempt to deduce its ultimate historical significance from this one feature alone.David Brooks, the columnist for the New York Times, has recently written an article clearly aiming to put Tea Partiers in their place. Their political movement represents only a minor quake. It may cause some rattling noises but poses no threat to the status quo. It too will pass, and everything will get back to normal again. The two established parties will regain their electoral monopoly and all will be well. According to Brooks, the Tea Party movement is not only similar to hippie movement of the 1960s in terms of its lack of overall historical significance, it is a lowbrow revival of that movement, leading Brooks (or at least his editors) to dub today’s Tea Partiers “The Wal-Mart Hippies”—the title of his article.
The phrase “Wal-Mart Hippies” is certainly attention-getting, as was no doubt intended. After all, who would suspect that there lurked a secret affinity between the carefree flower children of late ’60s and the hard-working folks who shop at Wal-Mart? The two groups would seem a study in antithesis. The flower children of the ’60s put flowers in gun barrels and chanted sweet songs of peace. At Wal-Mart people buy guns to put bullets in and use them to shoot cute and cuddly animals. Hippies scorned work and lived in idleness. The Wal-Mart shopper often works two jobs just to squeeze by. Flower children listened to acid rock. The folks at Wal-Mart adore Country and Western. Hippies celebrated free love. The people who fill the aisles of Wal-Mart marry, settle down, and raise families—often quite large ones. The hippies grooved on Zen or chanted Hare Krishna. The Wal-Mart crowd happily keeps Jesus at the wheel. Flower children opposed war. The Wal-Mart shopper sends off sons and daughters to fight them.
Flower children opposed war. The Wal-Mart shopper sends off sons and daughters to fight in them.But Brooks is not really comparing the Tea Party movement to the hippie movement of the ’60s. Instead, he is comparing it to the New Left of the same decade. In one respect he appears to have made an honest mistake. In his mind, the New Left and the hippie movement have strangely merged. Members of the New Left “went to Woodstock”—didn’t they? Actually, no, they didn’t. We should not confuse the carefree, frolicking hippie movement of that era with the mirthless and dour New Left of the same period. Hippies were whimsical spirits. The New Lefties were mirthless zealots. Hippies smoked pot and had fun. New Lefties read Lenin and plotted revolution. New Lefties regarded hippies as frivolous and fatuous. Hippies looked on New Lefties as the ultimate downers.
Let us concentrate on his main point. According to Brooks, the Tea Party movement should best be understood as a right-wing version of the New Left, and he lists a number of characteristics that they share: the desire to topple the status quo; a taste for conspiracy theories; a fear of being co-opted by agents of the establishment; a belief that human beings are basically good while power and authority are basically evil; a largely negative program based on an antagonism to the current state of things. In addition, Brooks points out that both the Tea Party movement and the New Left “go in for street theater, mass rallies, marches, and extreme statements”
In drawing these comparisons, Brooks scores several good hits. But his argument falls short in two important respects.
Those features shared by the Tea Party and the New Left are the staple elements of all forms of political radicalism.First, the set of characteristics Brooks has noted have been the common features of all the revolutionary movements throughout history, both great and small. The same points could be made about the Protestant Reformation of the 16th century, the Puritan Revolution of the 17th century, the American and French revolutions of the 18th century, the myriad revolutionary movements that broke out in Europe during the 19th century, and the Russian revolution of the 20th century. All these movements sought to topple the status quo, believed in conspiracy theories, feared co-optation, distrusted authority, began by tearing down the old order, and employed street theater, usually in the form of riots and violent insurrections. In short, those features shared by the Tea Party and the New Left are the staple elements of all forms of political radicalism. This greatly undermines Brooks’s attempt to minimize the historical potential of the Tea Party movement. True, it shares features of the historically insignificant New Left movement of the ’60s; but it also shares features with historically portentous movements, like the Protestant Reformation and the American Revolution.
Second, Brooks completely ignores the most striking feature of the New Left—the very quality that distinguished it from the Old Left. The Old Left, in good Marxist fashion, based its revolutionary hopes on the men and women who must work for a living, while the New Left went out of its way to culturally alienate working-class Americans by supporting the Black Panthers, attacking patriotism, insulting the police, and demeaning military service. Drawn largely from major universities, and often springing from privileged and affluent backgrounds, the adherents of the New Left were elitist to the core, assuring that the appeal of the New Left would be narrowly limited to only a tiny segment of the American population. But that is precisely the point at which Brooks’ comparison between the New Left and the Tea Party movement falls to pieces. The Tea Party movement has mass appeal; the New Left did not.
I’ve never attended a Tea Party, but can safely guess no one complains about ‘too many raps.”





